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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-19-cr-00232-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________ 
 
Submitted: June 23, 2021 
 
Before: CHAGARES, PORTER, and ROTH, 
Circuit Judges. 
 






PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Michael Gordon was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment for his role in a 
scheme to import counterfeit Xanax® pills. He now appeals his sentence on two grounds. 
 




First, he contends that the District Court’s calculation of the advisory Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines range was procedurally unreasonable. Second, he argues that the District 
Court’s imposed sentence was substantively unreasonable. For the reasons explained 
below, we will affirm. 
I1 
In June 2018, customs officials in the United Kingdom intercepted several parcels 
of suspected counterfeit Xanax® pills bound for the United States. The officials alerted 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which launched an investigation. The 
investigation uncovered a scheme by Michael Gordon and his coconspirator Eric Coney 
to import large amounts of counterfeit Xanax® pills; distribute them to local buyers in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and launder the proceeds through various financial accounts. 
Gordon purchased the pills from an online supplier who shipped them in parcels to 
various Philadelphia addresses associated with Gordon and Coney. The investigation 
identified thirty-two such parcels, fifteen of which were intercepted by law enforcement.  
The government charged Gordon with (1) conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit 
goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a), and (2) conspiracy to money launder in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Gordon pleaded guilty.  
At sentencing, the District Court adopted several enhancements and calculated a 
Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the District Court 
 
1 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will recite only the facts 




sentenced Gordon to 240 months’ imprisonment. The sentence included three years of 
supervised release following his imprisonment and an order to pay restitution of 
$2,768,500 and a special assessment of $200. Gordon timely appealed.  
II2 
A 
Gordon first claims that the District Court procedurally erred when it attributed to 
him 410,000 counterfeit Xanax® pills for purposes of calculating his Guidelines range 
because that drug quantity was “speculative and not based on actual physical evidence.” 
Appellant’s Br. 14. We disagree. 
District court error in calculating a Guidelines range can render a sentence 
procedurally unreasonable. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). We review the District 
Court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its application of the sentencing Guidelines to 
the facts for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 
2013). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, upon review of the record, we are 
“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete 
Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395 (1948)). 
 
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We 




When sentencing a defendant for a drug-related conviction that involves some 
quantity of unseized drugs, a district court must “approximate the quantity of the 
controlled substance.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 (U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n 2018); see also United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting 
that a “degree of estimation” is sometimes necessary when calculating the quantity of 
drugs in a drug trade operation). To approximate drug quantity, a district court may 
consider factors such as “the price generally obtained for the controlled substance, 
financial or other records, similar transactions in controlled substances by the defendant, 
and the size or capability of any laboratory involved.” U.S.S.G.M. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5. 
Altogether, the evidence “need not be admissible at trial,” but it “must possess ‘sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’” Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 203 (quoting 
United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993)). That indicia of reliability may 
be met through “corroboration by or consistency with other evidence.” United States v. 
Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 337 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Smith, 674 F.3d 
722, 732 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
The record contains evidence with sufficient indicia of reliability to support the 
District Court’s attribution of 410,000 counterfeit Xanax® pills to Gordon. First, 190,000 
of the 410,000 pill quantity—nearly half—is based on direct evidence of pill amounts 
from the fifteen parcels intercepted by law enforcement. The remainder of that pill 
quantity, 220,000, is an approximation of the pill amounts in the delivered parcels that 
went unseized.  
 
 5 
The approximation is supported, in part, by comparing the weights of the seized 
parcels with the weights of the unseized parcels. Among the fifteen seized parcels, each 
of the 5,000-pill parcels weighed three to four pounds; the 10,000-pill parcel weighed 
about six pounds; each of the 20,000-pill parcels weighed thirteen to fourteen pounds; 
and the 25,000-pill parcel weighed about sixteen pounds. Thus, given the consistency of 
the seized parcels’ weight-to-pill ratio, the unseized parcels’ known weights may be 
reliably used to extrapolate their unknown pill amounts. See United States v. Douglas, 
885 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that circumstantial evidence, not just direct 
evidence, may properly support a district court’s determination as to drug quantity). 
Additionally, the approximated pill quantities for the unseized parcels are 
corroborated by Gordon’s virtual payments for the counterfeit Xanax® pill shipments, the 
supplier’s online price listings, Gordon’s text communications with his distributors and 
customers, and agents’ surveillance of Gordon and Coney retrieving some of the 
delivered packages.  
In sum, upon review of the evidence supporting the District Court’s determination 
of the drug quantity, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed.” Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 622 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395). Thus, the District Court did not clearly err 
when it attributed 410,000 counterfeit pills to Gordon for purposes of calculating his 




Next, Gordon challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence imposed 
by the District Court as “unduly punitive based on the totality of circumstances.” 
Appellant’s Br. 29. Gordon musters several arguments in support of his challenge, but 
they are unavailing. 
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 2014). We will 
not hold that a sentencing court abused its discretion unless “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
the [sentencing] court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. “As long as a sentence falls 
within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in light of 
the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 
218 (3d Cir. 2008). Sentences that fall within the applicable Guidelines range are entitled 
to a presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 124 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
First, Gordon claims that the District Court’s failure to grant sufficient weight to 
certain mitigating factors in its § 3553(a) analysis suggests that his sentence was 
substantively unreasonable. At sentencing, the District Court considered the U.S. 
Probation Office’s findings, the parties’ arguments in sentencing filings, the witnesses’ 
testimony, and Gordon’s allocution. During its § 3553 factors analysis, the District Court 
acknowledged the mitigating factors raised by Gordon, including the support of his 
family and friends, his age of 31 years when the crimes were committed, and his lack of 
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prior criminal history. Ultimately, the District Court denied Gordon’s requests for 
downward variances and imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range. That Gordon 
disagrees with the District Court about the proper weight to afford various mitigating 
factors does not suggest a sentence is substantively unreasonable. United States v. 
Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Next, Gordon contends that the District Court’s alleged procedural error in 
approximating the pill quantity also contributed to a lack of substantive reasonableness. 
See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010). For the reasons already 
explained, this claim fails.  
Gordon also argues that the District Court erred when it applied three trademark-
related enhancements under § 2B5.3 because they were “duplicative” and targeted the 
same conduct. Appellant’s Br. 26–27. Gordon did not object on these grounds at 
sentencing, so we review for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 
256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
Contrary to Gordon’s assertion, the enhancements under § 2B5.3(b)(1), 
§ 2B5.3(b)(3), and § 2B5.3(b)(5) each reflect separate offense characteristics that are 
analytically distinct. Gordon’s conduct independently implicated each of these 
enhancements, so the District Court did not procedurally err in adopting them. 
Accordingly, the resulting increase to Gordon’s Guidelines range does not undermine the 
substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We thus ascertain no plain error in the District 
Court’s application of the three § 2B5.3 enhancements. 
 
 8 
Finally, Gordon urges that several “anomalies” in the sentencing process, 
essentially arising from difficulties with legal representation, call into question the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Appellant’s Br. 27.  In particular, 
Gordon claims that his difficulties with legal representation inhibited him from 
contributing to the Presentence Investigation Report and preparing adequately for his 
sentencing.  
At sentencing, the District Court considered these concerns as represented in the 
parties’ filings and Gordon’s allocution, but found them meritless. Rather, it found that 
much of what Gordon said in his allocution was incredible. Moreover, the record shows 
that Gordon was advised to secure counsel at three separate status conferences on 
October 2nd, November 12th, and November 21st, 2019. Indeed, at the final status 
conference before sentencing, the District Court found that Gordon’s continual failure to 
secure legal representation was “delay for the sake of delay.” App. 124. Under these 
circumstances, such “anomalies” do not undermine the fairness of the proceedings or 
color Gordon’s sentence as substantively unreasonable. 
In sum, given the District Court’s careful consideration of the circumstances of 
Gordon’s case, we find that Gordon’s sentence “falls within the broad range of possible 
sentences that can be considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” Wise, 515 
F.3d at 218. Within-guideline sentences are presumptively reasonable, Handerhan, 739 
F.3d at 124, and nothing on this record overcomes that presumption. Therefore, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed Gordon’s sentence.  
* * * 
 
 9 
Because we conclude that the District Court did not commit clear error when 
calculating Gordon’s Guidelines range or abuse its discretion when imposing a within-
guidelines sentence, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
